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Introduction
To Devolve, Or Not to Devolve?: The (D)Evolution of
Environmental Law
J. Clark Kelso*
Issues of federalism have become paramount in national policy debates over
the course of the last five years or so. States around the country have openly
rebelled against mandates from Washington ranging from voter registration to
immigration. The rebellion has been fought in the courts, in the halls of Congress,
and in the marketplace of ideas. The court battles have not been particularly
successful. Although the Supreme Court has not entirely shut the door to a strong
states' rights interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, and there now is some basis
for arguing a real limit upon Congress's Commerce Clause powers, it must be
admitted even by the most ardent states' rights advocates that these decisions
represent only minor victories in skirmishes that are generally at the margins. In
the long run, either because states will continue to find resources from Washing-
ton too attractive to be refused (notwithstanding the attached strings), or because
of Congress's fundamental primacy in setting federal policy (notwithstanding the
power of judicial review), the odds favor federal over states rights when Congress
chooses to act.
In fact, most of the successful federalism-based challenges to congressional
action have been raised by the states through the political, and not the judicial,
process. Most recently, the 1994 elections swept into Congress a majority that
professed commitment to a reduced federal role in all sorts of government pro-
grams. Passage of welfare reform in 1996 is certainly the most dramatic example
of a shrinking federal role in the planning and implementation of a major govern-
mental responsibility.
The 1994 elections raised the real possibility of an equally dramatic reduction
in the federal government's role in environmental protection since many of the
supporters of the new majority in Congress were harsh critics of environmental
law and policy. It was this possibility that prompted the Institute for Legislative
Practice at the McGeorge School of Law to conduct a symposium titled, "To
Devolve, Or Not to Devolve?: The (D)Evolution of Environmental Law."
Environmental law has always been sensitive to issues of federalism. In part,
this is because the subject matter of environmental law is both very local and very
national in its necessary scope. For example, the regulation of land uses has his-
torically been more of a state and local concern than a national concern. Localized
* J.D., 1983, Columbia University, Professor of Law and Director of the Institute for Legislative
Practice, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
1457
Pacific Law Journal/ Vol. 27
toxic spills generally have only local effects. Yet, airborne pollutants and con-
taminated water flow between regions and between states, oblivious to artificially
drawn state boundaries. Professor A. Dan Tarlock notes in his article that
"[b]iodiversity protection raises especially complex federalism problems because
of its site specific nature and the refusal of ecosystems and bioregions to conform
to political boundaries."'
Federalism issues are also close to the surface in environmental law because
economic and political realities have required that front-line enforcement
activities be divided between federal, state, and local governments. These dif-
ferent levels of government have been forced to work together in what became
known as "cooperative federalism." As Professor Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., explains
in his contribution to this symposium, "[t]he ultimate source of the states' power
is the fact that environmental programs cannot work without state cooperation.
'2
One of the major themes explored in the articles by Professors Reitze and
Thomas 0. McGarity is whether cooperative federalism has lived up to its
optimistic name in the context of the Clean Air Act. Their assessment is decidedly
skeptical. Professor Reitze concludes that "[s]tates that wish to be recalcitrant in
meeting their Clean Air Act requirements can and do use the claim of federalism
to avoid compliance.... It seems fair to say that federalism is faring much better
than the effort to protect the environment."3 Professor McGarity concludes, based
upon his exhaustive review of the history of Clean Air Act enforcement, that
nearly all of [the] progress [in improving air quality in urban areas] is
attributable to source control requirements directly or effectively im-
posed at the federal level and by lawsuits filed by affected citizens and
environmental groups aimed at forcing federal, state, and local agencies
to fulfill their statutory responsibilities.... [C]urrent efforts to accelerate
the 'devolution' of federal power to the states, if directed to urban
pollution control, could very easily reverse the encouraging trend of the
last five years and ensure that millions of American citizens never
breathe clean air.
In short, there has been little cooperation in cooperative federalism.
Professor Tarlock presents a different model of federalism-"partnership
federalism"--that is still in its gestational stage of development. In partnership
1. A. Dan Tarlock, Federalism Without Preemption: A Case Study in Bioregionalism, 27 PAC. LJ.
1629, 1631 (1996).
2. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the Clean
AirAct, 27 PAC. LJ. 1461, 1463 (1996).
3. Id. at 1520.
4. Thomas 0. McGarity, Regulating Commuters to Clear the Air: Some Diffculties in Implementing
a National Program at the Local Level, 27 PAC. LJ. 1521, 1524 (1996).
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federalism, state, and local interests are given their due in the formation of initial
federal policies which helps to avoid some of the friction that can result from state
resistance to federal mandates. As Professor Tarlock explains, partnership
federalism "allows states and local governments to define the content of federal
mandates [and] is increasingly characterized by multi-party agreements and
federal waivers of power rather than preemption."5 Some might contend that part-
nership federalism is simply a nice way of describing federal abdication of
authority in favor of doing whatever the states want and will agree to. However,
the federal government does not need to be a lightweight in these negotiations
since the negotiations should take place in the context of what Professor Tarlock
describes as "latent federal supremacy."6
The as-yet unanswered question is whether partnership federalism will do a
better job of protecting the environment than cooperative federalism did in the
context of the Clean Air Act. After all, we should assess the merits of models of
government not only on the basis of theoretic and political considerations (such
as conformity with fundamental notions of due process, equality under the law,
and democratic governance), but also on the basis of whether a particular model
produces results that, in the long run, are in the best interests of the community.
In closing this brief introduction, I invite you to dedicate some quiet time for
a thoughtful reading of the articles in this symposium issue. You will learn
important lessons about the past, present, and possible future of environmental
law, and about how our divided government does (and sometimes does not) work.
5. Tarlock, supra note 1, at 1651.
6. Id.
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